Limits of Persuasion: Germany and the Yugoslav Crisis, 1991-1992

(Hardback)

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This presents a detailed historical account of German diplomacy in the first year of the Yugoslav crisis and a thorough analysis of the issues that Germany and the international community faced at the time. Written by the German diplomat responsible for the conduct of German policy on the working level, the book is a first-hand view of the motives, perceptions and actions of the German government. Part 1 is a chronological treatment of the responses of the European Community and of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to developments on the ground - in particular, the military conflict in Croatia and the German role in shaping these responses. Part 2 provides a systematic treatment of the causes of the confict and the major issues raised by the Yugoslav crisis, such as questions concerning self-determination, frontiers, the role of history, and the recognition of successor states. Taken together, the two parts provide a comprehensive analysis of the origins of international involvement in the Bosnian war.

Reviews

"[H]e correctly identifies the problematic role of self-determination and Yugoslavism in the crisis of 1991-1992....He also correctly highlights the hypocrisy in Milosevic's periodic espousal of self-determination....He provides a detailed account of the negotiations leading to the December 15, 1991 decision of the European Union to recognize Croatia and Slovenia on January 15, 1992....Libal has read widely and does a strong, if polemical, job of confronting the major published accounts of Yugoslavia's collapse....Libal succeeds in adding another dimension to our understanding of European diplomatic reactions to Yugoslavia's collapse."-
[H]e correctly identifies the problematic role of self-determination and Yugoslavism in the crisis of 1991-1992....He also correctly highlights the hypocrisy in Milosevic's periodic espousal of self-determination....He provides a detailed account of the negotiations leading to the December 15, 1991 decision of the European Union to recognize Croatia and Slovenia on January 15, 1992....Libal has read widely and does a strong, if polemical, job of confronting the major published accounts of Yugoslavia's collapse....Libal succeeds in adding another dimension to our understanding of European diplomatic reactions to Yugoslavia's collapse.-
It is a welcome addition to literature....The first half of the book provides a meticulous, almost day-by-day account of the unfolding crisis....Libal's account of German policy is exhaustive, reliable, and balanced....In the end...Libal's excellent analysis helps to exonerate German policy towards Yugoslavia only up to a point....-H-Net Reviews
The first part of this book, based on the author's personal experience, is a valuable contribution to study of the issues.-International Journal
"He correctly identifies the problematic role of self-determination and Yugoslavism in the crisis of 1991-1992....He also correctly highlights the hypocrisy in Milosevic's periodic espousal of self-determination....He provides a detailed account of the negotiations leading to the December 15, 1991 decision of the European Union to recognize Croatia and Slovenia on January 15, 1992....Libal has read widely and does a strong, if polemical, job of confronting the major published accounts of Yugoslavia's collapse....Libal succeeds in adding another dimension to our understanding of European diplomatic reactions to Yugoslavia's collapse."-
"It is a welcome addition to literature....The first half of the book provides a meticulous, almost day-by-day account of the unfolding crisis....Libal's account of German policy is exhaustive, reliable, and balanced....In the end...Libal's excellent analysis helps to exonerate German policy towards Yugoslavia only up to a point...."-H-Net Reviews
"The first part of this book, based on the author's personal experience, is a valuable contribution to study of the issues."-International Journal

Author Bio

MICHAEL LIBAL is Ambassador, Head of the Mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to Georgia. An historian and political scientist by training, he has studied and taught at American universities. As a diplomat, he has specialized in Russian and Eastern European Affairs. From 1991 to 1995, he headed the German Foreign Ministry's department dealing with the Yugoslav crisis, and in 1995-1996 he was a Fellow of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University.