Military Force as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy: Intervention in Lebanon, August 1982-February 1984

(Hardback)

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Although over six years have passed since the Lebanon intervention ended, American leaders appear to be no closer to an appreciation of what went wrong than they were in 1984. Ralph Hallenbeck's authoritative account of the American intervention in Lebanon fills this significant void. His study goes a long way toward explicating those factors that contributed most to this foreign policy failure. America's role in Lebanon is examined in four chapters, with each chapter recounting the events that occurred during the successive phases of the intervention. At various junctures in the analysis, Hallenbeck compares his findings to those of other authors writing about the Vietnam War, an intervention that he feels strongly parallels the American experience in Lebanon. He also refers to the relevant body of politico-military and decision-making theory. The author's ultimate purpose in using this comparative approach is to suggest that conclusions derived from the study of the Lebanon intervention may be relevant both to an understanding of the past and to future attempts to achieve limited ends through the measured application of military force. Hallenbeck's case study is useful as both source material for students and scholars concerned with examining national security policy-making and as a critical discussion of recent events.

Reviews

A well-researched, well-written single-volume history of the 1982--84 US intervention in Lebanon, this is a good foreign policy case study written from a military point of view. The author, with a combined background of military command and doctoral level academic study in politico-military affairs, has managed to get to the heart of the political decision-making process, in both high governmental and military circles. For students, Hallenbeck periodically poses questions for thought and discussion. It is clear where the author is presenting the events as historical fact and where he has shifted to commentary or speculation. Includes a 15-page chronology of events, 44 pages of chapter notes, a bibliography (not exhaustive but good), four useful maps, and a glossary of acronyms. The book, with only 153 pages of text, is an excellent choice as a supplemental textbook for a course in low-intensity conflict at the undergraduate and especially the graduate level.-Choice
"A well-researched, well-written single-volume history of the 1982--84 US intervention in Lebanon, this is a good foreign policy case study written from a military point of view. The author, with a combined background of military command and doctoral level academic study in politico-military affairs, has managed to get to the heart of the political decision-making process, in both high governmental and military circles. For students, Hallenbeck periodically poses questions for thought and discussion. It is clear where the author is presenting the events as historical fact and where he has shifted to commentary or speculation. Includes a 15-page chronology of events, 44 pages of chapter notes, a bibliography (not exhaustive but good), four useful maps, and a glossary of acronyms. The book, with only 153 pages of text, is an excellent choice as a supplemental textbook for a course in low-intensity conflict at the undergraduate and especially the graduate level."-Choice

Author Bio

RALPH A. HALLENBECK is Manager of the Global Concepts Division at Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) and was Chief of Current operations, HQ USEUCOM, during the Lebanon intervention. He is co-author of On Disarmament: The Role of Conventional Arms Control in National Security Strategy (Praeger, 1991).