From Hitler's Germany to Saddam's Iraq: The Enduring False Promise of Preventive War
By (Author) Scott A. Silverstone
Bloomsbury Publishing PLC
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers
14th December 2018
United States
General
Non Fiction
European history
The Holocaust
Military and defence strategy
Military history
355.02
Hardback
336
Width 160mm, Height 236mm, Spine 26mm
590g
This book boldly challenges conventional wisdom about the value of preventive war. Beginning with the rise of German power and the French and British response to the Rhineland crisis leading to World War II, Scott Silverstone overturns the common impulse to point an accusing finger at British leadership for its alleged navet, willful blindness, or outright cowardice. Arguing against the belief that Britain could have contained Germany and avoided war if it had used force when Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland, the author uses this dramatic event to wrestle with a general strategic problem that has broad relevance for our current foreign policy dilemmas. Silverstone argues that the Rhineland crisis is a critical case for studying a central dynamic of world historypower shifts among statesand the preventive war temptation that power shifts frequently produce. There has been surging interest in the idea of preventive war, an interest stimulated by the Bush administrations articulation of the preemption doctrine in 2002 and the disastrous invasion of Iraq in 2003, and by frustration over the difficulty of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons by such states as North Korea and Iran. Clarifying the way we think about preventive war, the author analyzes the enduring strategic flaws in preventive war that must inform how political leaders and the public think about this option as a means of dealing with shifting threats in the modern world. Offering a radically conservative argument for when to wage war, this persuasive book will be essential reading for policy makers and concerned citizens alike.
This is a fine book on what the author calls the preventive war fallacynamely, that striking out militarily against an adversary who violates law or convention usually doesnt work . . . Silverstone is a sober scholar who impressively marries military experience and a mastery of strategic theory. * MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History *
An incisive and important new book. . . . [Silverstone] provides an important and necessary model for thinking about the costs and benefits of any given military action. Given the disastrous experience of the Iraq war, we would do well to remind future preventive war hawks (of which there will inevitably be many), whether were dealing with a nuclear Iran or a rising China, of the history of preventive wars false prophecy. * The American Conservative *
This is a powerful and provocative critique of the temptation to engage in preventive war against potential enemies. Whether you agree or disagree with Silverstone's conclusions, you will benefit from his deep knowledge of history and his reminder to remain humble about one's ability to predict the long-term outcome of the use of military force. -- Scott D. Sagan, Stanford University
At the very top of the list of political catastrophes and devastating wars that we wish could have been prevented is the Nazi domination of Europe and World War II. In this enlightening and deeply researched study, Scott Silverstone describes just how difficultindeed, nearly impossiblethat would have been. And in that tragic story are profound lessons for the difficulty of nearly all successful acts of preventive war. -- Michael Doyle, author of Striking First: Preemption and Prevention in International Conflict
The obvious lesson of the 1930s is that leaders should eliminate gathering threats before they mature. To the contrary, Scott Silverstones careful reexamination of this and other cases shows that preventive war, although tempting, usually is a trap. The preventive war paradox is that while such a war can succeed tactically, it may fail to secure a lasting peace. Humility, patience, and the understanding that there are few silver bullets in international politics are better guidelines. -- Robert Jervis, Author of How Statesmen Think
Silverstone provides a timely critique of strategies of preventive war. His historically rich analysis of the 1930s is complemented by illuminating comparisons with ancient Greece and Rome and the contemporary era. He shows that short-term military success against rising powers often increases long-term strategic threats rather than eliminates them. Silverstones well-written book is essential reading for international relations theorists, diplomatic historians, policy makers, and others concerned with international peace and security in a changing and uncertain world. -- Jack S. Levy, Rutgers University
Scott A. Silverstone is an ASU Future of War Fellow at New America and a professor of international relations at the United States Military Academy at West Point. He holds a PhD in political science from the University of Pennsylvania and has had an extensive military career. His books include Divided Union: The Politics of War in the Early American Republic and Preventive War and American Democracy.