David Hume on Miracles, Evidence, and Probability

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David Humes argument against believing in miracles has attracted nearly continuous attention from philosophers and theologians since it was first published in 1748. Humes many commentators, however, both pro and con, have often misunderstood key aspects of Humes account of evidential probability and as a result have misrepresented Humes argument and conclusions regarding miracles in fundamental ways. This book argues that Humes account of probability descends from a long and laudable tradition that goes back to ancient Roman and medieval law. That account is entirely and deliberately non-mathematical. As a result, any analysis of Humes argument in terms of the mathematical theory of probability is doomed to failure. Recovering the knowledge of this ancient tradition of probable reasoning leads us to a correct interpretation of Humes argument against miracles, enables a more accurate understanding of many other episodes in the history of science and of philosophy, and may be also useful in contemporary attempts to weigh evidence in epistemically complex situations where confirmation theory and mathematical probability theory have proven to be less helpful than we would have hoped.

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Drawing from a diverse set of historical facts about Hume as well as from his writing, Vanderburgh makes a very straightforward and convincing argument. Seemingly working his way, one by one, down the list of prominent Hume detractors, Vanderburgh methodically points out the crucial flaws in each of their arguments or interpretations of Hume, thereby undermining their conclusions of Hume's failure. . . . While this is a rather short treatment for such a storied and complex debate, Vanderburgh maintains good focus throughout and presents his argument in a refreshingly concise style. Vanderburgh pulls no punches in telling the reader which commentators he thinks are wrong, and why, before moving on to present his arguments. He does not talk around his arguments or lose the reader in a sea of jargon or unnecessary asides. Vanderburgh, quite simply, gets to the point. This monograph will make an excellent addition to the bookshelves of Hume scholars, epistemologists, and, in a more limited sense, philosophers of religion.

Author Bio

William L. Vanderburgh is professor of philosophy at California State University, San Bernardino.