Quine, Conceptual Pragmatism, and the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction

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W. V. Quines occasional references to his pragmatism have often been interpreted as suggesting a possible link to the American Pragmatism of Peirce, James, and Dewey. Quine, Conceptual Pragmatism, and the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction argues that the influence of pragmatism on Quines philosophy is more accurately traced to his teacher C.I. Lewis and his conceptual pragmatism from Mind and the World Order, and his later An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation. Quines epistemological views share many affinities with Lewiss conceptual pragmatism, where knowledge is conceived as a conceptual framework pragmatically revised in light of what future experience reveals. Robert Sinclair further defends and elaborates on this claim by showing how Lewiss influence can be seen in several key episodes in Quines philosophical development. This correspondence highlights a forgotten element of the epistemological backdrop to Quines mid-century criticism of the analytic-synthetic distinction, and Sinclair further argues that it provides the central epistemological framework for the form and content of Quines later naturalized conception of epistemology.

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In presenting a historical overview of Quines philosophical response to Lewis conceptual pragmatism, Sinclair offers a fresh perspective on the interplay between pragmatism and analytic philosophy in the mid-twentieth century. This work broadens our knowledge about Quines development, deepens our understanding of his objections to the analytic-synthetic distinction, and sheds new light on his naturalized epistemology. Sinclairs book, in sum, is a must read for all Quine scholars and a valuable recourse for historians of analytic philosophy.

In Quine, Conceptual Pragmatism and the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction, Robert Sinclair traces the often underappreciated influence of C.I. Lewis and his conceptual pragmatism on Quines early development. Starting with his graduate work, Sinclair details Quines growing discomfort with Lewiss reliance on both the analytic-synthetic distinction and phenomenalism. While Quine was at first hopeful about analyticity, Sinclair shows how the exchanges with Lewis and Quines commitment to Lewiss own style of pragmatism contribute to Quines rejection of the epistemological significance of the analytic-synthetic distinction and to his eventual move to naturalized epistemology. Emphasizing Lewiss influence clarifies Quines claim to a more thorough pragmatism by taking us beyond just the typical focus on Carnaps role. Further, tracing continuities between Lewis and Quine, Sinclair sheds useful light on the genesis and structure of Quines mature naturalism. Writing with clarity and a deft command of primary and secondary literature, Sinclair deepens and broadens our perspective on Quines development and a crucial period in the history of analytic philosophy.

Author Bio

Robert Sinclair is professor of philosophy in the Faculty of International Liberal Arts at Soka University in Tokyo.