Epistemic Issues in Pragmatic Perspective
By (Author) Nicholas Rescher
Bloomsbury Publishing PLC
Lexington Books
6th December 2017
United States
Professional and Scholarly
Non Fiction
121
Hardback
240
Width 161mm, Height 235mm, Spine 22mm
481g
This book presents a nonstandard approach to epistemology. Where standard epistemology generally focuses on the certain knowledge the Greeks called epistm, the present focus is on some less assured modes of information. Its deliberations will focus on such cognitively suboptimal processes as conjecture, guesswork, and plausible supposition. This shift of focus has implications for virtually every sector of information management, and the books instigations presented here will explore some of them. Throughout the rule of pragmatic considerations stand in the foreground.As the books deliberations set out in detail, the nature of our knowledge of reality is inherently conditioned by the fact of its beings the product of what is, at best and at most, a matter of rational guesswork. And so as regards our knowledge, we had best adopt the pragmatic optimism of expectingand hopingthat our best is good enough.
Rescher has a wonderful talent for moving from common sense observations to profound philosophical conclusions in just a few clearly reasoned steps. Here that talent is in full display with an analysis of the various pragmatic mechanisms of rational guesswork, plausible conjecture, analogical reasoning, extrapolation, and inference by explanation that really make up what we rely on as knowledge, both scientifically and in our everyday lives. -- Patrick Grim, Stony Brook University
Nicholas Rescher began publishing on epistemology and pragmatism in 1964, and has long beenthe leading philosopherin the area. This book collects his recent essaysin the field, giving special attention to such nonstandard sources of information as rationalguessworkand plausible supposition. It highlights Rescher's distinctive focus on the justification of epistemic standards by their utility in shaping our effective practices. Readers will come away with adeeper understanding oftherole of pragmatic factors in epistemic evaluation andtheir compatibility with objectivity and realism. -- Paul K. Moser, Loyola University Chicago
Epistemic Issues in Pragmatic Perspective is an excellent book. Rescher updates his clearest, articulate, and quite wonderful journey through the heart of pragmatic epistemology. In past works he has argued that truth as we usually understand it, is not a necessary condition for propositional knowledge about the external world. For the persuasive reasons he urges, there is always some real probability that any of our beliefs about the physical world will be rejected and replaced in the future. Accordingly, the attainment of truth is always, and only an Aspirational goal rather than a necessary condition for knowledge providing certainty. What the real world is at any given moment is what the human mind constructs and represents in its most useful pursuits of biological and evolutionary adaptation. In the end he notes that some of our beliefs will be correct descriptions of the world, but our inherent limitations as a species prevent us from deciding once and for all which of our beliefs are closest to our aspirations to truth. -- Robert Almeder, Georgia State University
Nicholas Rescher is distinguished university professor of philosophy at University of Pittsburgh.