Hume and the Demands of Philosophy: Science, Skepticism, and Moderation

(Hardback)

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With a comprehensive interpretation of Humes scientific project to his skepticism, Hume and the Demands of Philosophy: Science, Skepticism, and Moderation argues that Hume is a radical epistemic skeptic who has purely practical reasons for retaining the beliefs that are essential for ordinary life and scientific research. Nathan I. Sasser argues that the key to Humes epistemology is his conception of philosophy as a normative method of inquiry governing the special sciences. Philosophy approves of the mental faculties that produce reasoning and sensory beliefs. But sensory beliefs and the products of reason themselves face insuperable rational defeater arguments, and because they do, philosophy demands that we suspend these beliefs. Humes solution to this skeptical dilemma is to point out the fatal practical consequences of suspending these core beliefs. He advises us not to submit to the demands of philosophy in cases where doing so is neither agreeable nor useful to ourselves or others. Humes moderate approach to philosophy recognizes that since our faculties are not created by a beneficent God, the epistemic demands of philosophy and the practical demands of life sometimes diverge.

Reviews

"Hume and the Demands of Philosophy is a careful and serious treatment of Hume's scepticism. Sasser adroitly draws an overarching narrative of Humes epistemology, offering Humes thought a pleasing unity not just within a given text, but across his different works. The book is faithful to the texts; competently and fairly engages and critiques the secondary literature; and offers a strong defense of a novel position. It is a fine contribution to the literature."

Author Bio

Nathan I. Sasser is assistant professor of philosophy and head of the humanities department at Greenville Technical College.