Unreal Beliefs: An Anti-Realist Approach in the Metaphysics of Mind

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Krzysztof Poslajko offers a novel version of an anti-realist view about beliefs, rejecting the extreme proposal of eliminativism that beliefs do not exist. He shows us we should rather say that beliefs exist, but they are not real.

Poslajko demonstrates how we might make sense of this idea by providing a unified account of the debates in philosophical psychology. The antirealist view interprets beliefs as being causally irrelevant, that they do not constitute a natural kind, and that their content cannot be naturalized. Exploring the status of folk psychology, Poslajko raises key questions in the analytic metaphysics of mind: Are beliefs real Do people really possess mental states which are causally efficacious bearers of propositional content

By arguing for the antirealist view and revising our common-sense view about the nature of mind, he makes a compelling case for adopting a pragmatic metaphilosophy when we deal with questions about belief.

Reviews

Unreal Beliefs is an outstanding addition to the literature on the metaphysics of belief. Poslajkos sophisticated anti-realism about belief will be of interest not only to philosophers of mind but to anyone concerned with realist versus anti-realist debates more generally. * Alex Miller, Professor of Philosophy, University of Otago, New Zealand *
A clear, thorough, deeply systematic, and highly original discussion of the ontological status of beliefs. Poslajkos innovative treatment promises to reignite the debate about the psychological reality of the central category of our folk psychological ontology. * Tadeusz Zawidzki, Associate Professor and Chair of Philosophy, George Washington University, USA *
Poslajko leads us on a wide-ranging tour of the nature of belief, showing us how debates in the 1980s on the reality or unreality of belief look through the lens of 21st-century metaphysics and philosophy of mind. He offers a plausible defence of the surprising view that although beliefs exist, they are not fully real and will likely not play a role in a mature cognitive science. * Eric Schwitzgebel, Professor of Philosophy, University of California, Riverside, USA *

Author Bio

Krzysztof Poslajko is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the Jagellonian University, Poland.