U.S. Unilateral Arms Control Initiatives: When Do They Work

(Hardback)

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As a former negotiator, I wish I had had the benefit of Profssor Rose's insights and I am confident that future U.S. negotiators will profit from them. Paul C. Warnke, Former Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency The first systematic appraisal of the utility of unilateral initiatives in arms control, this study combines theory and case studies to provide important insights and implications for U.S. policy. Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations, Stanford University I consider Dr. Rose's book to be a very significant contribution to the field. The topic--unilateral arms control initiatives--is one that has drawn sporadic attention in the past, but I know of no better analysis of this important topic than Dr. Rose's. Dan Caldwell, Pepperdine University The question has been continuously debated since the 1950s: Should unilateral arms control initiatives be treated as essential steps toward world peace or as the product of wishful thinking that is in fact dangerous to our national security Rose explores the problem through an analysis of Soviet responses to past American initiatives, where the U.S. exercised restraint in weapons testing, production, or deployment in attempts to obtain reciprocal Soviet restraint. In comparative case studies of six U.S. arms initiatives--some of which succeeded and some of which failed--he tests and evaluates a series of hypotheses about the conditions that may favor the success of such initiatives. After outlining the major features of the arms control controversy, Rose surveys the theoretical literature to identify factors that may favor successful initiatives. These include aspects of the bargaining process; cost-benefit calculations about the military, political, and economic consequences of reciprocating an initiative; and other elements in the domestic and international environment that may effect the outcome of bargaining. The factors that are influenced by the domestic nature or international situation of the Soviet Union are examined in detail.

Reviews

"As a former negotiator, I wish I had had the benefit of Professor Rose's insights and I am confident that future U.S. negotiators will profit from them."-Paul C. Warnke Former Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
"I consider Dr. Rose's book to be a very significant contribution to the field. The topic--unilateral arms control initiatives--is one that has drawn sporadic attention in the past, but I know of no better analysis of this important topic than Dr. Rose's."-Dan Caldwell Professor of Political Science Pepperdine University
"The first systematic appraisal of the utility of unilateral initiatives in arms control, this study combines theory and case studies to provide important insights and implications for U.S. policy."-Alexander George Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations Stanford University
In this book, a revised doctoral dissertation, William Rose sets out to examine to what extent unilateral American arms control initiatives have evoked reciprocal arms restraint on the part of the Soviet Union. In addition, the author attempts to establish the conditions under which such unilateral initiatives have succeeded and those under which they have failed. The method used involves the construction of a stipulative and deductive model of the factors that may condition the outcomes of bargaining based on unilateral American initiatives. . . . For the specialist, the focus upon a particular bargaining strategy, the unilateral initiative, has use. For college students, the surveys of particular episodes in the history of Soviet-American arms control may be helpful. . . .-Perspectives on Political Science
Rose has given his audience a unique and fairly comprehensive view of the role of unilateral initiative in the diplomatic process. His five case studies involve US of Soviet post-WWII actions. He does devote a rather dreary chapter to theory and method in which he develops several hypotheses, variables, and factors, but his case studies are generally accurate, interesting, and provocative. The case study on the ABM would have benefited greatly by an analysis of the US unilateral decision to dismantle the Safeguard ABM in 1975. In addition, Rose probably should have looked at the consequences of the 1967 US unilateral freeze on the number of ICBM's, which had far greater long-term implications than the decision on the neutron bomb. Nevertheless, his work, which certainly has plowed new ground, will be of interest to scholars. Unfortunately, largely because of his attempt to develop a methodology for the diplomatic process and to provide guidelines, Rose's volume will be of little interest to professionals in the field. A well-documented study preceded by a helpful glossary. University libraries will be enriched by its acquisition. As a text, however, it will prove useful only in advanced graduate seminars in military studies and strategy.-Choice
"In this book, a revised doctoral dissertation, William Rose sets out to examine to what extent unilateral American arms control initiatives have evoked reciprocal arms restraint on the part of the Soviet Union. In addition, the author attempts to establish the conditions under which such unilateral initiatives have succeeded and those under which they have failed. The method used involves the construction of a stipulative and deductive model of the factors that may condition the outcomes of bargaining based on unilateral American initiatives. . . . For the specialist, the focus upon a particular bargaining strategy, the unilateral initiative, has use. For college students, the surveys of particular episodes in the history of Soviet-American arms control may be helpful. . . ."-Perspectives on Political Science
"Rose has given his audience a unique and fairly comprehensive view of the role of unilateral initiative in the diplomatic process. His five case studies involve US of Soviet post-WWII actions. He does devote a rather dreary chapter to theory and method in which he develops several hypotheses, variables, and factors, but his case studies are generally accurate, interesting, and provocative. The case study on the ABM would have benefited greatly by an analysis of the US unilateral decision to dismantle the Safeguard ABM in 1975. In addition, Rose probably should have looked at the consequences of the 1967 US unilateral freeze on the number of ICBM's, which had far greater long-term implications than the decision on the neutron bomb. Nevertheless, his work, which certainly has plowed new ground, will be of interest to scholars. Unfortunately, largely because of his attempt to develop a methodology for the diplomatic process and to provide guidelines, Rose's volume will be of little interest to professionals in the field. A well-documented study preceded by a helpful glossary. University libraries will be enriched by its acquisition. As a text, however, it will prove useful only in advanced graduate seminars in military studies and strategy."-Choice

Author Bio

WILLIAM ROSE is Assistant Professor of Government at Connecticut College. His articles on arms policy and arms control have appeared in Arms Control: The Journal of Arms Control and Disarmament, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, and other publications.