Britain and the Confrontation with Indonesia, 1960-66

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The confrontation with Indonesia cut to the heart of Britain's desire to retain global power status in the 1960s and was central to decolonisation and British defence policy across South-East Asia. Factors such as the need to maintain a military base in Singapore drove strategy and this confrontation became a major commitment - close at times to escalating into full-scale regional war. However, 'the Confrontation' was not recorded as a conflict of this scale, and Britain was cast into a passive and defensive role. Here, David Easter reveals a radically different view, persuasively making the case that Britain waged a secret and aggressive war against President Sukarno's Indonesia. It was the covert nature of operations and the deliberate decision of British policy-makers to keep the full extent of this conflict away from public scrutiny that has allowed it to be overshadowed in the annals of history.

Reviews

'Where Easter breaks entirely new ground is in his treatment of the clandestine and covert side of Britain's struggle with Indonesia - Easter gives us the best picture to date of the uncertainties generated in Whitehall during the final months of the conflict... This is a fine addition to the recent literature on the confrontation, and provides a significant perspective on the links between progress in the conflict with Indonesia and the general process of withdrawal from South-East Asia.' - Matthew Jones, Professor of Modern History, University of Nottingham

Author Bio

David Easter is a Lecturer in the Department of War Studies at King's College London. He has previously taught at the London School of Economics, where he completed his PhD in International History.