US-Egypt Diplomacy under Johnson: Nasser, Komer, and the Limits of Personal Diplomacy

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What happens to policies when a president dies in office Do they get replaced by the new president, or do advisers carry on with the status quo In November 1963, these were important questions for a Kennedy-turned-Johnson administration. Among these officials was a driven National Security Council staffer named Robert Komer, who had made it his personal mission to have the United States form better relations with Egypts Gamal Abdel Nasser after diplomatic relations were nearly severed during the Eisenhower years. While Kennedy saw the benefit of having good, personal relations with the most influential leader in the Middle Eastbelieving that it was the key to preventing a new front in the global Cold WarJohnson did not share his predecessors enthusiasm for influencing Nasser with aid. In US-Egypt Diplomacy under Johnson, Glickman brings to light the diplomatic efforts of Komer, a masterful strategist at navigating the bureaucratic process. Appealing to scholars of Middle Eastern history and US foreign policy, the book reveals a new perspective on the path to a war that was to change the face of the Middle East, and provides an important applied history case study for policymakers on the limits of personal diplomacy.

Reviews

US-Egypt Diplomacy under Johnson is a well-researched and significant book which chronicles and analyzes how one government official, Robert Komer, shaped American-Egyptian diplomatic relations. For Komer, a grand strategy meant working with Nasser in spite of ideological differences to contain Soviet influence in the Middle East. This book is a must read for anyone wishing to understand how one individual greatly influenced diplomacy between Washington and Cairo from the Kennedy Administration to the Johnson Administration. -- Michael Sharnoff, National Defense University's Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, USA
Gabriel Glickman has written an illuminating history of U.S.-Egyptian diplomacy in the LBJ era. Its an account of world affairs, grand strategy, strong personalities, bureaucratic fancy footwork, idealism, calculation, lies and naivet. Especially fascinating is the story of how Egypts Nasser condemned the United States in justifying his actions that brought on the 1967 Six Days War with Israel. Were Nassers complaints about U.S. policy a substantial factor in Egypts war policy, or mostly a pretext Could the United States have averted the war by giving more aid to Egypt These are worthy questions, and Professor Glickmans book contributes importantly to the debate. -- Douglas J. Feith, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute, USA and former US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Author Bio

Gabriel Glickman is an Associate Fellow at Bar-Ilan Universitys Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. His writing has appeared in publications such as The Washington Post, The National Interest, The Jerusalem Post, and The Hill.