The Casualty Issue in American Military Practice: The Impact of World War I

(Hardback)

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Huelfer examines the casualty issue in American military thought and practice during the years between the World Wars. He argues that Americans exhibited a distinct aversion to combat casualties duirng the Interwar Period, a phenomenon that visibly influenced the military establishment and helped shape strategic planning, force modernization, and rearmament for World War II. In a broad topical approach, Huelfer's main themecasualty aversionis woven into discussions about military strategy and policies, doctrinal and technological development, the military education system, and how the American officer corps emerged from World War I and prepared for World War II. As Huelfer makes clear, aversion to combat casualties is not just a post-Vietnam War phenomenon, but rather has long been embedded within the American national heritage. Conventional wisdom link today's exacerbated aversion to combat casualties as fallout from the Vietnam debacle. In fact, this Vietnam Syndrome has remained at the forefront of contemporary strategic thinking. Huelfer shows that American political and military leaders have held lasting concerns about risking soldiers' lives in combat, even pre-dating U.S. involvement in World War II. The grim experiences of World War I had a profound impact upon the U.S. officer corps and how it viewed potential future conflicts. The casualty issue permeated the officers' strategic culture during the Interwar Period and colored their thinking about improving training, doctrinal evolution, force modernization, and technological development. Even though one cannot find the terms casualty issue, casualty aversion, or sensitivity to casualties directly stated in the speeches and writings of the era, this awareness clearly emerged as a subtext for the entire American effort in preparation for World War II. Huelfer highlights how casualty aversion shaped American strategy for World War II by incorporating ideas about the use of overwhelming force, air power, and mechanizationall designed to minimize losses.

Reviews

"American armed forces are generally described as reluctant to accept combat casulaties. This attitude is usually linked to post-Cold War factors such as fear of unfavorable publicity. Huelfer's monograph demonstrates instead that the national aversion to casualties is deeply rooted. It developed in the aftermath of World War I, and conditioned the officer corps to minimize losses as far as possible in future conflicts. Well into World War II, U.S. military policy reflected a desire to limit the direct commitment of ground forces for the purpose of avoiding casualties, favoring instead the use first of sea and air power, then of armor and artillery. Ironically, losses under those circumstances were frequently higher than might have been the case with a more robust initial attitude to the casualty issue."-Dennis Showalter, Colorado College
"Evan Huelfer's study of the interwar U.S. Army's extensive deliberations about accomplishing its missions without the excessive loss of American lives forces us to look well before Vietnam for the roots of today's concerns about "body counts" and the influence of combat deaths on policy decisions."-Carol Reardon, Author of Soldiers and Scholars: The U.S. Army and the Uses of Military History, 1865-1920
"Sets the contemporary American preoccupation with casualty aversion and force protection in its broader historical context. It is a thoughtful, well-researched, and eminently readable contribution to our understanding of the American way of war."-Charles F. Brower, IV Brigadier General, U.S. Army (Retired) Deputy Superintendent for Academics and Dean of the Faculty, Virginia Military Institute
"In The "Casualty Issue" MAj. Evan Huelfer, a former history instructor at West Point, makes a compelling argument that America's aversion to accepting casualties in any conflict is deeply rooted in the experience of World War I, and not, as one might today assume, entirely a reaction to the war in Vietnam. This book is all the more interesting when viewed against the growing casualty lists from our current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and the public reaction to them."-Army History
[A]dds a much-needed and unique element to the existing scholarship on American military history between the world wars....[H]uelfer's book will prove useful to anyone interested in American military history between the world wars.-The Journal of Military History
Anyone interested in the interwar years period or in how military institutions affect change should read this clearly written and well-documented book.-The Journal of American History
In The "Casualty Issue" MAj. Evan Huelfer, a former history instructor at West Point, makes a compelling argument that America's aversion to accepting casualties in any conflict is deeply rooted in the experience of World War I, and not, as one might today assume, entirely a reaction to the war in Vietnam. This book is all the more interesting when viewed against the growing casualty lists from our current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and the public reaction to them.-Army History
This well-researched book takes readers on a tour of strategic, tactical, and organizational policies formed between 1919 and the opening events of WW II. Each chapter enables readers to better understand the Victory Plan: how WW II was fought, and why....This exceptionally sophisticated book is very welcome. Highly recommended.-Choice
"Adds a much-needed and unique element to the existing scholarship on American military history between the world wars....Huelfer's book will prove useful to anyone interested in American military history between the world wars."-The Journal of Military History
"[A]dds a much-needed and unique element to the existing scholarship on American military history between the world wars....[H]uelfer's book will prove useful to anyone interested in American military history between the world wars."-The Journal of Military History
"Anyone interested in the interwar years period or in how military institutions affect change should read this clearly written and well-documented book."-The Journal of American History
"This well-researched book takes readers on a tour of strategic, tactical, and organizational policies formed between 1919 and the opening events of WW II. Each chapter enables readers to better understand the Victory Plan: how WW II was fought, and why....This exceptionally sophisticated book is very welcome. Highly recommended."-Choice

Author Bio

EVAN ANDREW HUELFER is a major on active duty in the U.S. Army. He has served in a wide variety of command and staff positions. Dr. Huelfer has taught Military History at West Point. In 2003 he served as the Lead Planner for the Coalition Forces Land Component Command in Kuwait. Among his earlier publications is his edited collection Readings for the History of Military Art (2000).