The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of Failure in High Command

(Hardback)

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The reverses experienced by Canadian troops during the late stages of World War II continue to be the subject of intensive inquiry among military historians. Going beyond the obvious immediate causes of theses setbacks, the author presents a deatiled hsitorical examination of the role of the Canadian army in Normandy and of the organization, training, and fighting-style that the Canadian brought tot he battlefield in 1944. In Part 1, the author analyzes the impact of the British military model on the Canadian corps in terms of doctrine, training, command and staff appointments, equipment, and organization. He discusses the contribution of Canadian troops in World War I and the failure of the Canadian military to maintain a high level of professionalism in the interwar period. Drawing on archival records, particularly Montgomery's personal correspondence, the author offers new information on attempts to turn pooryl trained troops into an effective fighting force as late as 1943. Part 2 presents a critical analysis on Canadian operations in Normandy. The author gives special attention to the Canadian Army's inability to close the "Falaise Gap" in a timely manner--a delay that may have prolonged the war in Europe by several months. Providing both theoretical and practical perspectives on the relationship of peacetime preparation to the operation of large field forces in battle, this work should be of interest to students and buffs of military history and to professional analysts and strategic planners in the armed services.

Reviews

[A]n outstanding analytical study that raises important questions about the army and the society that created it...The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign is an excellent book full of insight as well as new information.-The Canadian Historical Review
English has produced a remarkably rich record of a multiple of elements that are fascinating to read and fit together. It is well written, thoroughly researched and documented, and usefully illustrated. It is an honest reappraisal of the received version of Canadian experience in the Normandy campaign. The frank identification of the reality of responsibility resting with the Canadian commanders whose abilities, or lack thereof, were products of the decade of peace during which they had led is a valuable addition to he written historical record and to the theoretical approach to the Canadian military experience.-The Historian
This book is a welcome and necessary addition to the literature. It will be warmly received by Normandy veterans, and will stimulate much interest and debate amongst professional soldiers and military historians alike.-The International History Review
This immensely stimulating book by John A. English enrishes the already distinguished new generation of scholarship on the armies of the Western Allies of 1939-45.-American Historical Review
"An outstanding analytical study that raises important questions about the army and the society that created it...The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign is an excellent book full of insight as well as new information."-The Canadian Historical Review
"[A]n outstanding analytical study that raises important questions about the army and the society that created it...The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign is an excellent book full of insight as well as new information."-The Canadian Historical Review
"This book is a welcome and necessary addition to the literature. It will be warmly received by Normandy veterans, and will stimulate much interest and debate amongst professional soldiers and military historians alike."-The International History Review
"This immensely stimulating book by John A. English enrishes the already distinguished new generation of scholarship on the armies of the Western Allies of 1939-45."-American Historical Review
"English has produced a remarkably rich record of a multiple of elements that are fascinating to read and fit together. It is well written, thoroughly researched and documented, and usefully illustrated. It is an honest reappraisal of the received version of Canadian experience in the Normandy campaign. The frank identification of the reality of responsibility resting with the Canadian commanders whose abilities, or lack thereof, were products of the decade of peace during which they had led is a valuable addition to he written historical record and to the theoretical approach to the Canadian military experience."-The Historian

Author Bio

JOHN A. ENGLISH is Associate with the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He recently completed a three-year tour on the Directing Staff of the Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College. He is the author of the acclaimed book On Infantry (Praeger, 1981) and principal editor of The Mechanized Battlefield: A Tactical Analysis. He has also written a number of articles on military subjects that have appeared in Jane's Military Review, Infantry, Naval War College Review, Canadian Defense Quarterly, Marine Corps Gazette, and Military Affairs.